- SMB/SME
- Enterprise
· ASC Editorial Team
One Supplier's Script, 178 Websites: What the Optimizely Attack Teaches About Third-Party Code
On 16 November 2026, attackers added malicious JavaScript to customer projects in Optimizely, a platform that organisations use to test changes to their websites. Optimizely said an unauthorised party had exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account sign-up flow. Because websites load Optimizely's code from Optimizely's own servers, the malicious code reached every visitor to the affected sites, with the same trust as the sites' own code.
Scott Helme of Report URI, who researched the attack, checked 1,611 Optimizely code snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organisations. He says the real number is probably higher. Banking and finance was the largest group, with 32 organisations. The UK names on his list include the BBC, Equifax UK, TalkTalk, interactive investor and Admiral.
The code did several things. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses on the page and in the clipboard. From the afternoon of 16 November it captured card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into the sites' own forms. It sent cookies and screenshots to the attackers, and it served exploit kits aimed at older iPhones. Card payments taken in hosted payment fields, such as those from Stripe or Adyen, were out of its reach.
Optimizely says it blocked the vulnerable path, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and notified the customers affected. Report URI says every infected file was clean by 23:11 UTC on 16 November. About $7,000 in cryptocurrency reached the attackers' wallets. How many card details reached them is not known.
None of these organisations was breached in the usual sense. Their supplier was. We have written before about how much of the UK's breach risk sits with suppliers, in our article on the supply chain gap. This is the website version of the same problem. Every script a site loads from another company can do anything the site's own code can do.
What separated the sites was their Content Security Policy, a header that tells browsers which scripts may run and where a page may send data. Among the affected organisations' sites that Report URI checked, 68 had no policy at all, and 50 had one that let the code run and send data out. On 17 more, the code ran, but the policy stopped it sending card details, cookies or screenshots anywhere. On 24, it was blocked outright. Policies that allowed `unsafe-eval` let the code through.
If you use Optimizely, Report URI advises the following: - check your project JavaScript for unknown code; - review and rotate Optimizely users, API tokens and integrations; - treat cards entered on your site on 16 November as potentially exposed; - rotate any session tokens or secrets held in cookies that scripts can read.
Whatever tools you use, three checks follow.
First, list every third-party script on your payment, login and account pages, with who owns it and why it is there. Remove the ones nobody can explain. For card payments this is already expected: PCI DSS v4.0 asks merchants to keep an inventory of payment-page scripts, authorise each one and detect changes.
Second, set a Content Security Policy that names the scripts allowed to run and, just as important, the places a page may send data. Avoid `unsafe-eval`, and turn on reporting so you hear when the policy blocks something.
Third, keep card entry inside your payment provider's hosted fields, and mark session cookies HttpOnly so scripts can't read them.
Could you list every script that runs on your payment page today, and who can change it?
Source: Report URI: World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely
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